Race-Specific Agglomeration Economies: Social Distance and the Black-White Wage Gap by Elizabeth Ananat et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
RACE-SPECIFIC AGGLOMERATION ECONOMIES:










Ananat gratefully acknowledges funding from the William T. Grant Foundation. Any opinions and
conclusions expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views
of the U.S. Census Bureau or the National Bureau of Economic Research. All results have been reviewed
to ensure that no confidential information is disclosed. Support for this research at the Boston and
New York RDC from NSF (ITR-0427889) is also gratefully acknowledged.
At least one co-author has disclosed a financial relationship of potential relevance for this research.
Further information is available online at http://www.nber.org/papers/w18933.ack
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2013 by Elizabeth Ananat, Shihe Fu, and Stephen L. Ross. All rights reserved. Short sections of
text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit,
including © notice, is given to the source.
Race-Specific Agglomeration Economies: Social Distance and the Black-White Wage Gap
Elizabeth Ananat, Shihe Fu, and Stephen L. Ross




We demonstrate a striking but previously unnoticed relationship between city size and the black-white
wage gap, with the gap increasing by 2.5% for every million-person increase in urban population.
We then look within cities and document that wages of blacks rise less with agglomeration in the
workplace location, measured as employment density per square kilometer, than do white wages.
This pattern holds even though our method allows for non-parametric controls for the effects of age,
education, and other demographics on wages, for unobserved worker skill as proxied by residential
location, and for the return to agglomeration to vary across those demographics, industry, occupation
and metropolitan areas. We find that an individual’s wage return to employment density rises with
the share of workers in their work location who are of their own race. We observe similar patterns
for human capital externalities as measured by share workers with a college education. We also find
parallel results for firm productivity by employment density and share college-educated using firm
racial composition in a sample of manufacturing firms. These findings are consistent with the possibility
that blacks, and black-majority firms, receive lower returns to agglomeration because such returns
operate within race, and blacks have fewer same-race peers and fewer highly-educated same-race peers
at work from whom to enjoy spillovers than do whites. Data on self-reported social networks in the
General Social Survey provide further evidence consistent with this mechanism, showing that blacks
feel less close to whites than do whites, even when they work exclusively with whites. We conclude
that social distance between blacks and whites preventing shared benefits from agglomeration is a
significant contributor to overall black-white wage disparities.
Elizabeth Ananat
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I.   Introduction 
Two well-documented characteristics of American cities are agglomeration economies—
cities exhibit higher productivity (Ciccone and Hall 1996; Henderson 2003) and wages (Glaeser 
and Maré 2001) than do less-urbanized areas—and high levels of racial inequality, with African-
Americans facing significant segregation in many aspects of daily life and on average earning 
substantially less than do whites, even when conditioning on a variety of measures of 
productivity (Neal and Johnson 1996; Lang and Manove 2006; Black, Haviland, Sanders and 
Taylor 2006).  An entirely unexplored question in the literature is whether one component of 
racial pay disparities is that blacks and whites derive different benefits from agglomeration, and 
if so whether social distance between blacks and whites is a cause of the difference. 
A previous undocumented characteristic of American cities that is consistent with this 
possibility is that the racial wage gap rises with city size. Figure 1 shows that the gap between 
blacks and whites rises from a base of 12% of wages by 0.3 percentage points (or 2.5%) for each 
million additional people in a metro area. 1   A one-standard-deviation increase in total 
employment increases the black-white wage gap by 0.66 percentage points, and a one-standard-
deviation increase in employment density (workers per square mile) increases the black-white 
wage gap by 1.38 percentage points. Looking within metropolitan areas, we find very similar 
effects. A one standard deviation increase in workplace employment density (defined as workers 
per square kilometer in the PUMA2 of work) increases the wage gap by 1.9 percentage points.  
                                                          
1Put another way, the average racial wage gap in metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) of around one million people, 
such as Tulsa, OK, is 20% smaller than the gap in the nation’s largest metro areas of Chicago, Los Angeles, and 
New York City. 
2 Workplace is based on the Public Use Microdata Area (PUMA), defined to report residential location in the Public 
Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) of the 2000 Decennial Census, and is constructed to contain a population of 100,000 
residents. We calculate workplace PUMA variables based on the population of workers reporting their work location 
at the census tract level, which is then matched to 2000 PUMA definitions. The PUMS also reports individual 
workplace using an alternative “workplace PUMA,” but these definitions vary dramatically across metropolitan 
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The combination of 1) this new evidence on the relationship between city size, workplace 
employment density and skill composition, and the racial wage gap, 2) recent research 
emphasizing the importance of workplace networks (both intra- and inter-firm) in generating 
wage returns to employment density and human capital concentration, and 3) recent empirical 
work demonstrating that work networks are race-specific, suggests that the possibility of 
differential returns to agglomeration by race is worthy of more thorough investigation.  In this 
paper, we demonstrate that African-Americans receive smaller wage benefits from employment 
density and human capital concentration than do whites, even when including highly flexible 
controls intended to capture both observed and unobserved individual attributes and when 
allowing for very heterogenous returns to workplace characteristics. Further, we provide 
evidence that one major driver of this relationship is that African-Americans have fewer same-
race peers in the workplace from whom to enjoy productivity spillovers. We observe very similar 
patterns for wage returns to share college educated workers in the workplace, which we interpret 
as reflecting human capital externalities. Finally, we provide evidence that social distance 
between blacks and whites—that is, lower levels of social interaction conditional on physical 
proximity—persists regardless of the racial mix of the workplace. 
Studies of both the black-white wage gap and of agglomeration and the urban wage 
premium raise unobserved productivity attributes as a fundamental concern. Neal and Johnson 
(1996) and Lang and Manove (2006) use AFQT score as an measure of individual ability and 
find that inclusion of AFQT substantially erodes the estimated black-white gap.  Glaeser and 
Maré (2001), Wheeler (2001), Yankow (2006), and Combes et al. (2008) find that the estimated 
wage premium associated with city size decreases substantially after the inclusion of a worker 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
area. Fu and Ross (2010) confirm that agglomeration estimates are robust to alternative workplace definitions 
including workplace PUMA, PUMA, and zip code area.   
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fixed effect. Our paper addresses this concern by following an approach developed by Fu and 
Ross (In Press). They use residential location fixed effects to compare similar individuals who 
reside in the same location, but work in different locations, exploiting the fact that households 
systematically sort into residential locations where they are similar to the other residents. They 
demonstrate that residence fixed effects provide an effective control for unobserved ability, and 
find no evidence of bias in agglomeration estimates from workers sorting into high density 
locations based on ability. 3  Further, in our sample, we find that controlling for residential 
location fixed effects eliminates any correlation between employment density or share college 
and indicators for whether an individual is white or black and  reduces unexplained racial 
differences in wages by 53%, which is comparable to the 48% reduction in the black-white wage 
gap found by Lang and Manove (2006) from the inclusion of the AFQT score, suggesting that 
the method adequately captures unobserved skill differences between blacks and whites. 
In this paper, we document that wages of blacks rise less with employment density than 
do white wages for a sample of prime age, fully employed males residing in metropolitan areas 
with more than one million residents. Even after controlling non-parametrically for the effects of 
observables such as age, education, and other demographics, as well as of unobservables through 
residential location, and after allowing for the return to agglomeration to vary across observable 
demographics, industry, occupation, and metropolitan area, we find that a one standard deviation 
increase in employment density leads to a 1.7 percentage point increase in the black-white wage 
gap, very similar in magnitude to the 1.9 percentage point estimated effect mentioned above.  
                                                          
3 Specifically, they find that the inclusion of census tract fixed effects has very little influence on the estimated 
return to employment density across a wide variety of wage models, including models that omit all individual 
demographic attributes. Consistent with this conclusion they show that the within-metropolitan-area correlation 
between observable ability and agglomeration is very low. Further, they also demonstrate that the wage return to 
density is unlikely to be driven by unobserved ability, because observationally equivalent workers in different work 
locations are earning similar wages net of commuting costs and so earning similar real wages.  See Albouy and Lou 
(2011) for similar logic on the difference between real and nominal wages within metropolitan areas. 
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Further, we demonstrate that there is no within-metropolitan correlation between employment 
density and worker race.    
Next, we explore whether these differences in returns might be explained by race-specific 
information networks (Hellerstein et al. 2009; Ionnides and Loury 2004).  Consistent with this 
hypothesis, we find that higher own-race representation in a work location increases the returns 
to employment density. These results are consistent with blacks receiving lower average returns 
to agglomeration because on average they have fewer same-race peers from whom to enjoy 
spillovers and so gain less productivity.  Given our estimates, the black-white difference in 
exposure to workers of the same race explains 65% of the estimated racial difference in the 
return to agglomeration.   
To test whether this difference in returns reflects a difference in worker productivity 
(rather than in, say, bargaining power), we estimate total factor productivity (TFP) models for 
manufacturing establishments 4  covering the same metropolitan areas as our worker sample. 
Following Moretti (2004), we identify a sample of workers in each establishment based on zip 
code-three digit industry cells, and we confirm that firm TFP increases in locations that have 
high concentrations of employment. 5  Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that the 
productivity returns to agglomeration fall substantially when the race of the firm’s workers does 
not closely match the racial composition of the surrounding location.  In fact, we calculate that 
racial differences in average firm productivity that arise because black workers are employed at 
firms that have a worse demographic match with the surrounding location can explain up to 0.6 
percentage points of the black-white wage gap.     
                                                          
4 TFP models can only be estimated in manufacturing establishment data because establishment data for other 
industries do not contain estimates of either materials costs or capital stock. 
5 Our results are for within-MSA variation, whereas Moretti examines MSA-level variation. 
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While higher productivity in large cities and dense employment locations is a relatively 
accepted feature of urban economies, the existence of economies associated with human capital 
externalities is much more controversial. Moretti (2004a) finds evidence of higher wages in cities 
with greater concentrations of college-educated workers even after controlling for worker fixed 
effects. In contrast, Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) find no evidence of human capital externalities 
across states using quarter of birth as an instrument, and Ciccone and Peri (2006) find no 
evidence of human capital externalities in cross-metropolitan wage differences after taking into 
account the effect of the change in the mix of low and high skill workers in production. On the 
other hand, Moretti (2004b) finds evidence of higher firm productivity in cities with a large share 
of college graduates even after controlling for both the mix of low and high skill labor and firm 
fixed effects.6   
For completeness, we also examine racial differences in the return to the concentration of 
college-educated workers, and results are very similar to those for employment density, with 
blacks receiving a lower wage return than whites to their work location’s share of college-
educated workers. These differences are substantially explained because blacks have lower 
exposure to same-race college-educated workers and because they tend to work in firms in 
locations where few of the college-educated workers are of the same race as the majority of their 
own workers.  While there is no correlation between share college and worker race after 
conditioning on residential location, these results still must be interpreted with some caution 
                                                          
6 Fu and Ross (In press) also find mixed evidence.  They find that returns to human capital externalities are 
attenuated significantly by the inclusion of residential fixed effects raising the possibility that remaining effects 
might be driven by unobservables that were not captured by residential location.  However, they also demonstrate 
that the remaining estimated effects of human capital externalities are unlikely to be driven by unobserved ability 
because observationally equivalent workers in work locations with different shares of college-educated workers are 
earning similar wages net of commuting costs. 
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because the estimated effects for return to share college, unlike our estimates for return to 
employment density, fall substantially as additional controls are added.7  
The share of same-race peers at work should not matter for spillovers if workers are 
equally likely to enjoy spillovers from any peer, regardless of racial (mis)match. However, self-
report data from the General Social Survey demonstrate that African-Americans feel much 
greater social distance from whites than from blacks8, and that there is no significant reduction in 
this gap for African-Americans who work in majority-white firms. Even working in an all-white 
firm does not increase African-Americans’ average self-reported relative closeness to whites.  
We view this evidence as further support for same-race information networks as a plausible 
mechanism by which African-Americans receive smaller returns to agglomeration than do 
whites.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II reviews the literatures on 
agglomeration economies and on the causes of wage disparities as motivation for our hypothesis 
that racial wage gaps are partially driven by weaker same-race workplace networks through 
which to gain from agglomeration. Section III describes our wage model. Section IV describes 
the individual data, and section V presents results. Section VI discusses and concludes. 
 
II. Literature review  
Racially segregated networks and labor market outcomes 
A large and diverse literature documents the disadvantages and adverse outcomes 
experienced by African-Americans in segregated neighborhoods and metropolitan areas. 
                                                          
7 Our simple within-metropolitan-area estimates imply a 5.0 percentage point standardized effect of share college on 
the black-white wage gap, but the estimated effect falls to only 1.3 percentage points in our preferred specification. 
8 Defined as the difference between an individual’s reported “closeness to blacks” and that individual’s reported 
“closeness to whites” on a 9-point ordinal scale. 
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African-Americans experience much higher levels of residential segregation and centralization 
than other minority groups (Massey and Denton 1993), and adverse changes in U.S. central cities 
over the last several decades may have disproportionately affected African-Americans. Wilson 
(1987) argues that African-Americans’ outcomes are negatively affected by their concentration 
in increasingly poor and distressed central city neighborhoods. Kain (1968) suggests that the 
increasingly poor job access of African-Americans in central cities may have adverse effects, and 
recent work by Hellerstein et al. (2008) finds that employment depends heavily on physical 
access to locations where members of one’s own race are employed.9 Edin et al. (2003) and 
Damm (2006) find that the placement of refugees into ethnic enclaves in Sweden and Denmark, 
respectively, affects labor market outcomes.  
Beyond the potential social influences of location, labor market outcomes are directly 
influenced by relationships between workers, and these relationships are mostly segregated by 
race.  Bayer et al. (2008) illustrate the importance of referrals within homophilic networks in 
obtaining employment; they find that similar individuals who reside on the same block are more 
likely to work together and that the similarity of a worker to others residing nearby drives both 
employment and wages. Hellerstein et al. (2009) find that employees at the same firm are more 
likely to come from the same neighborhood than are employees who work at different firms in 
the same location, and, notably, that this effect primarily operates within racial and ethnic 
groups. Dustman et al. (2009) find that minority workers in Germany are much more likely to 
work in locations where other minorities work.10  
 
                                                          
9 The literature associated with the spatial mismatch hypothesis is huge.  See Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist (1998) and 
Kain (1992) for detailed surveys. 
10 Ioannides and Loury (2004) provide a detailed review of the extensive literature on labor market referrals and 
networks documenting several important stylized facts.  Also see Granovetter (1995). 
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Networks and agglomeration economies 
 Given the strong evidence that a major source of agglomeration economies is spillovers 
across individuals,11 it stands to reason that peer and social interaction effects that arise in dense 
areas increase individual and firm productivity. For example, Nanda and Sorenson (2008) find 
evidence of peer effects on self-employment that suggests knowledge- or experience-sharing 
between workers. In addition, if peers share knowledge not only about how to be productive on 
the job, but also about job opportunities, match quality may be greater in denser areas. Peers may 
affect one another’s productivity through establishing norms about absenteeism or work effort 
(Bokenblom and Ekblod 2007; Ichino and Maggi 2000; Lindbeck et al. 2007; DePaola 2008; 
Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul 2005; Falk and Ichino (2006); Mas and Moretti 2006). 12 These 
putative mechanisms, however, depend essentially on actual social interactions between peers. 
To the extent that, even within the same industry, individuals are more likely to associate with 
peers of the same race, race-specific knowledge and job-finding networks (Hellerstein et al. 
2009) could explain why in most industries (where whites make up the bulk of workers), 
knowledge spillovers may accrue more to whites than to nonwhites. 
                                                          
11 The most direct evidence of workers’ productivity being influenced by surrounding firms, workers, and/or 
economic activity arises from papers exploring reasons for the well-documented fact that wages are higher in large 
labor markets with high concentrations of employment and human capital. Glaeser and Maré (2001) find that 
workers who migrate away from large metropolitan areas retain their earnings gains, suggesting that these 
permanent gains arise because workers gain skills from working in dense urban areas. Rosenthal and Strange (2006) 
and Fu and Ross (2010) find evidence that wage benefits from local-area employment density and human capital 
concentration arise within metropolitan areas. Rosenthal and Strange document a fairly rapid decay of these 
spillovers across space, again consistent with agglomeration resulting from social interactions, as opposed to 
deriving from shared infrastructure or externalities associated with a broader labor market.  At the firm level, 
Rosenthal and Strange (2003) find that the likelihood of firm births is increased by the geographic proximity of 
other firms in the same industry, especially within the first mile, suggesting a substantial role for social interactions. 
Ellison, Glaeser and Kerr (2010) find evidence that spillovers between firms explain a significant portion of the co-
agglomeration of industries using metrics for the extent that firms share workers and ideas. Audretsch and Feldman 
(1996) and Feldman and Audretsch (1999) demonstrate that the composition of surrounding industry affects the rate 
of product innovation. Finally, Moretti (2004) finds that firms are more productive and more innovative when 
located in cities that have more educated workers, even after controlling for the education level of the firm’s 
workforce. See Audretsch and Feldman (2004), Duranton and Puga (2004), Moretti (2004) and Rosenthal and 
Strange (2004) for detailed surveys of the literature on agglomeration economies and production externalities within 
cities. 
12 See Ross (In Press) for a recent review of the general literature on neighborhood and peer effects. 
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In this paper, we test whether racial disparities exist in the return to workplace 
externalities, examining two types of externalities. The first, captured by the density of industry-
specific employment in the part of an MSA in which an individual works (the “workplace 
PUMA”), focuses on general spillovers associated with the total amount of a given type of 
economic activity in an area, or industry-specific agglomeration economies. The second, 
captured by the share of workers in an individual’s workplace PUMA who are college graduates, 
focuses on skill-based human capital spillovers. We also test whether own-race share of 
employment in the area where an individual works moderates the racial disparity in return to 
agglomeration. Finally, in order to help explain why racial disparities exist in the return to 
agglomeration, we show that social distance between blacks and whites is not reduced by 
workplace proximity. Arguably due to this lack of social contact, we also find that firm-level 
productivity is not increased by the presence of other firms when there is racial mismatch with 
the employees of those firms. 
 
III. Model Specifications for the Wage Models 
 First, to establish a baseline measure of agglomeration economies, we estimate the 
following equation for the log wages (𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑠) of individual i in work location j and metropolitan 
area s: 
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑠 = 𝑍𝑗𝑠𝛾 + 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝛽 + 𝑊𝑖𝑠𝜌 + 𝛿𝑠 + 𝛼𝑖𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑠      (1) 
where 𝑍𝑗𝑠 is a measure of workplace externalities in an individual’s work location, captured by 
either employment density or share college-educated, 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑠  is a vector of individual level 
demographic indicators, 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑠  is a vector of industry and occupation indicators, 𝛿𝑠  captures 
metropolitan area fixed effects, 𝛼𝑖𝑠  represents individual unobservables, and 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑠  represents an 
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idiosyncratic error term.  Equation (1) can be estimated for the entire sample or for specific 
subsamples, and for consistency this equation (1) implicitly requires the assumption that workers 
do not sort into locations with high or low 𝑍𝑗𝑠 based on unobservable attributes 𝛼𝑖𝑠. 
 Second, our main analysis collapses the individual data to observationally equivalent 
groups, indexed by {xt} to indicate individuals who belong to the same demographic cell x and 
reside in the same residential location t, and we allow agglomeration effects to vary in magnitude 
by both 𝑋𝑖𝑠 and 𝑊𝑖𝑠 via 𝛾𝑠𝑥 and 𝜔𝑖𝑠, respectively. 
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑥𝑡 = 𝑍𝑗𝑠(𝛾𝑠𝑥 + 𝜔𝑖𝑠) + 𝑊𝑖𝑠𝜌 + 𝛿𝑥𝑡 + 𝛼�𝑖𝑠𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑥𝑡      (2) 
where  
𝛾𝑠𝑥 = 𝑋𝑠𝑥𝜃 + 𝜑𝑠 and  𝜔𝑖𝑠 = 𝑊𝑖𝑠𝜋        (3) 
𝛿𝑥𝑡 is the demographic cell-residential location fixed effect,13 𝑋𝑠𝑥 is subscripted by x instead of i 
to capture the fact that X does not vary within group, 𝜑𝑠 represents the metropolitan specific 
return to 𝑍𝑗𝑠  , and 𝛼�𝑖𝑠𝑥𝑡  is the individual unobservable that remains after conditioning on 𝛿𝑥𝑡 , 
where 𝛿𝑥𝑡 is included in the model in order to weaken the correlation between the error and the 
terms involving 𝑍𝑗𝑠.  Following Fu and Ross (2013), the logic behind this specification is that 
observationally equivalent individuals who observe the same residential opportunities within a 
metropolitan area and then make the same choices are likely to be relatively similar on 
unobservables. Equations (2) and (3) can be estimated using a single stage linear model. 
 Standard errors estimates via equation (1) suffer from the bias identified by Mouton 
(1986) because individuals who selected into the same work location j share the same value of 
𝑍𝑗𝑠, and so standard errors are clustered at the work location j.  The standard errors in equation 
(2) may suffer from the bias identified by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) for clustered 
                                                          
13 Note that the demographic cell-residential location fixed effects capture both the coefficients on 𝑋𝑖𝑠 from equation 
(1) and the MSA fixed effects 𝛿𝑠. 
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data with fixed effects, which in our case can be addressed by clustering standard errors at the 
residential location t.  The Moulton (1986) bias is almost certainly far less severe in the model 
described by equations (2) and (3) because estimates are based on the within-group deviation of 
𝑍𝑗𝑠, which will only take the same value for individuals who belong to the same demographic 
cell and choose the same residential location and work locations.  Further, all individuals who 
share a common mean-differenced value of 𝑍𝑗𝑠 reside in the same location, and so any 
correlation of this sort is also handled by the clustered standard errors.  Nonetheless, as a 
robustness test for our standard errors, we examine an alternative model based on Donald and 
Lang (2007) that explicitly recognizes that the demographic differences in the return to 
agglomeration captured by 𝜃 are only identified by variation across the groups defined by 
demographic cell x and metropolitan area s.14     
 
IV. Data for the Wage Models 
The main models in this paper are estimated using the confidential data from the Long 
Form of the 2000 U.S. Decennial Census. The sample provides detailed geographic information 
on individual residential and work location. A subsample of prime-age (30-59 years of age), full 
time (usual hours worked per week 35 or greater), male workers is drawn for the 49 
Consolidated Metropolitan and Metropolitan Statistical Areas that have one million or more 
residents. 15  These restrictions lead to a sample of 2,343,092 workers, including 1,705,058 
whites, 226,173 blacks, 264,880 Hispanics, and 135,577 Asians.  
                                                          
14 See appendix for details. 
15 This sample is comparable to the sample drawn from the Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) of the 2000 
Census by Rosenthal and Strange (2006) except that we explicitly restrict ourselves to considering residents of mid-
sized and large metropolitan areas. 
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Table 1 reports individual, employment location PUMA, 16 and metropolitan area 
characteristics by race 17  (white, African-American, Hispanic, or Asian) of the worker. Our 
dependent variable is the logarithm of the wage, which is based on an individual’s labor earnings 
last year divided by the product of the number of weeks worked and the average hours per week 
worked last year. Our demographic controls include categorical variables by age, education, 
family structure, and immigration status. These controls are also used to create the 
observationally equivalent cells described above. At the employment PUMA, we measure 
employment density using workers per square mile and potential human capital spillovers by 
calculating the share of workers with at least four years of college education based on all full-
time workers reporting this employment location. The variables capturing the share of workers in 
each category who are the same race as the individual are also constructed using all full-time 
workers. 
Table 2 reports the results of a basic agglomeration economies model for the entire 
sample. The regression controls for a variety of individual characteristics (age, race, education, 
family structure, and nativity), metropolitan, industry and occupation fixed effects, as well as for 
education levels in the worker’s industry and occupation at the MSA level, with standard errors 
clustered at the level of the employment location PUMA. As expected, both within-industry 
employment density and within-industry share of workers with a college degree in an 
individual’s PUMA of employment strongly predict higher wages for that individual, consistent 
                                                          
16 As described in footnote 2, we use the more homogenously defined residential PUMA, which is used to report 
residential location in the PUMS, to classify employment location, rather than measuring location using workplace 
PUMA.   
17 Throughout the paper we use the term “race” interchangeably with “race and ethnicity” to capture distinctions 
between non-Hispanic whites (“whites”), non-Hispanic blacks (“blacks” or “African-Americans”), non-Hispanic 
Asian-Americans (“Asians”), and Hispanics of any race (“Hispanics”). 
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with the existence of agglomeration economies and human capital spillovers.18 A one-standard-
deviation increase in density (i.e. an increase in one’s own industry and PUMA of 2100 workers 
per square kilometer) is associated with increases in wages of 2.6 percentage points. A one-
standard deviation increase in share college-educated (i.e. a 17-point increase in share college-
educated in one’s own PUMA-industry) is associated with increases of 6.6 percentage points. 
In order to provide additional insight into our identification strategy, we examine the 
correlation between our work location attributes, employment density and share college, with an 
indicator for racial identity.  Table 3 column 1 presents the correlation for an indicator for 
whether the individual is white and column 2 presents the correlation for an indicator for whether 
an individual is black.  The first panel shows the unconditional correlations between these 
variables.  The correlation between employment density and white is -0.018 and between share 
college and white is 0.053.  The correlations for the black indicator are substantially smaller, at 
0.008 and -0.007, respectively.  While small, these correlations raise some concerns about 
sorting over our variables of interest.  Conditioning on metropolitan fixed effects lowers the 
correlation of employment density substantially to -0.003 and 0.003 for the black and white 
indicators, respectively, but has less effect on the correlations with share college, leaving them at 
0.035 and -0.022, respectively.  However, the inclusion of tract fixed effects substantially 
reduces the correlation with share college to -0.001 for blacks and 0.007 for whites.  These 
correlations are consistent with the findings of Fu and Ross (2013) that there is little sorting 
across workplace based on employment density, but that estimates on share college are likely to 
                                                          
18 The within-industry and overall values of employment density and share college are highly correlated, and horse 
race models with the same controls as those used in Table 2 suggest that the within-industry variables better fit the 
data.  Earlier models estimated using overall values of employment density and share college instead of own 
industry value also find racial differences in the wage returns to density and share college, as well as a substantial 
role for share own race in workplace in terms of explaining these differences.   
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be substantially more sensitive to controls for unobserved ability.  We therefore interpret our 
results for share college with some caution. 
Next, in Table 4, we examine the racial and ethnic differences in wages over a variety of 
models with alternative sets of fixed effects.  The column 1 estimates are from the same 
metropolitan area fixed effect model as reported in Table 2. The inclusion of tract fixed effects in 
column 2 reduces the black-white difference in wages from over 14 percentage points with just 
metropolitan area fixed effects to just below 7 percentage points, which is in line with Lang and 
Manove’s (2006) estimates of the black-white wage gap after controlling for ability using the 
AFQT test.  The black-white difference in wages remains between 6 and 7 percentage points 
across a variety of controls including block group, demographic cell by tract, industry by tract, 
and occupation by tract fixed effects.  Note, however, that the inclusion of demographic cell by 
tract fixed effects erodes the Hispanic/non-Hispanic differences in wages, decreasing the 
difference of 0.094 in the tract fixed effect model to 0.066 in the cell by tract fixed effect model.  
 
V. Results 
Table 5 re-estimates the models from Table 2 separately by race and ethnicity, and 
reveals that whites receive higher than average returns to both employment density and share 
college, while nonwhites receive much lower than average returns. African-Americans, in 
particular, get returns only about one-third as large as the white returns, 0.0047 versus 0.0138 for 
employment density and 0.145 versus 0.439 for share college. While other groups have smaller 
differences overall, Hispanics get half as much return as whites from share college and Asians 
get half as much return as whites from employment density. 
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Having established the basic pattern of racial differences in returns, we turn in Table 6 to 
the complete model described in equations (2) and (3), where demographic cell by census tract 
fixed effects are included to control for unobserved ability differences, and where the 
agglomeration variables are interacted with worker demographics, industry, occupation and 
metropolitan area in order to control for differential returns to agglomeration that might be 
correlated with observable factors. . The estimates presented in the top panel of Table 6 represent 
the interactions of employment density and share college with education, family structure and 
immigration status.  As discussed above, standard errors are clustered at the census tract level. 
Table 6 column 1 reveals that the return to employment density differs little by age, 
education (with the exception of graduate level education), or immigration status. While these 
are significant drivers of wages themselves (see Table 2), they do not appear in most cases to 
greatly affect the relationship between wages and employment density. Age and, especially, 
education increase the wage benefit from the share college-educated in one’s workplace and 
industry, as might be expected.   By contrast, blacks receive a substantially lower return to 
employment density than do workers of other races. The estimated difference between whites 
and blacks in the gain from agglomeration is greater than the difference in gain among those with 
a degree beyond a master’s degree relative to those with only a high school diploma. (In 
comparison, this same education difference for wages, as shown in Table 2, is more than three 
times the racial gap for wages). Further, the inclusion of cell by tract fixed effects and the large 
number of interactions with employment density do little to erode the observed racial 
differences.  In Table 5, the racial differences in the return to employment density imply that a 
one standard deviation increase in agglomeration is associated with a 1.9 percentage point 
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increase in the wage gap, and the differences estimated in Table 6 are consistent with a 1.7 
percentage point increase.  
We also find a substantial relationship between share college and the black-white wage 
gap, as shown in Table 6 column 2. A one standard deviation increase in share college is 
associated with a 1.3 percentage point increase in the black-white wage gap.  However, unlike 
with employment density, race is not the dominant demographic factor for explaining differences 
in the wage return to share college. The effect of education on returns is substantially larger than 
the effect of race, and the effect of experience/age differences is similar in magnitude to the 
observed race coefficients.  Further, this estimated effect is substantially smaller than the 5.0 
percentage point increase in the wage gap implied by a one-standard deviation increase in share 
college in Table 5; unlike with employment density, our controls substantially erode the black-
white gap in return to share college.19  Therefore, again, the results for share college should be 
interpreted with more caution than the employment density results.  
Significantly, Hispanics do not experience lower wage premiums than whites from 
density or share college-educated in the workplace in our full model specification. In other 
words, it appears that Hispanics get the same returns from agglomeration and human capital 
externalities as do whites after controlling for heterogeneity in the return to these spillovers and 
for unobservables that are identified by residential sorting. For Asian-Americans, results are less 
consistent, with significantly higher returns to share college than whites in the fully interacted 
model, but no significant difference in return to density, and marginally significantly lower 
                                                          
19 The black-white gaps for tract and tract by demographic cell fixed effect models estimated separately by race are 
2.8 and 3.4 percentage points, respectively.  Therefore, the fixed effects explain between 43 and 59 percent of the 
reduction and the heterogeneous returns to share college explain the rest of the reduction.  
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return than whites to density in the two-stage model shown in the appendix, but no significant 
difference in return to share college.20 
The racial return gap and the racial composition of the workforce 
Table 7 tests whether the pattern of racial disparities in the returns to agglomeration is 
consistent with agglomeration economies arising from race-specific networks. Under such 
circumstances, nonwhites may be disadvantaged because they lack same-race peers in the area 
where they work. To examine this hypothesis, we control for own-race share in order to test 
whether it moderates racial differences in the return to agglomeration. For employment density, 
the return to and racial difference in return to overall employment density are interacted with 
own-race share of employment in the PUMA.  For share college, the return to share college 
educated and racial differences in return are interacted with own-race share of college educated 
workers in the PUMA. Not surprisingly, the effect of each of these interactions is positive and 
highly significant, consistent with own-race workplace networks as a conduit for receiving 
returns to agglomeration.21  
In fact, the magnitudes of the coefficients on these controls suggest that exposure to 
others of the same race is a very important conduit for receiving returns to agglomeration. The 
effect of having only members of one’s own race in one’s PUMA (.0537) on the return to density 
is much larger than the average return to density from Table 2 (.0118). The effect of having only 
                                                          
20 The appendix contains estimated standard errors using a three-stage estimation approach based on Donald and 
Lang (2007).  This approach yields quite similar standard error estimates as clustering at the census tract level.  In 
addition, the appendix presents a series of robustness tests showing the estimated racial differences across the same 
set of alternative fixed effect structures considered in Table 4. 
21 The estimates presented are from specifications that include level controls for the two own race variables. All 
results are robust to whether these level controls are included or excluded from wage models.  
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members of one’s race make up the college-educated workforce in one’s PUMA is 0.160, which, 
while smaller than the average return to share college-educated (.389), is still appreciable.22 
Moreover, black-white differences in own-race share of the workforce can explain a 
significant portion of the black-white difference in the return to employment density and in the 
return to share college-educated. From Table 4, the effect of a one standard deviation change in 
employment density on racial differences in wages is 1.7 percentage points, while the estimates 
from Table 6 and the observed racial differences in exposure to own race of 0.211 are associated 
with a standardized effect of 1.1 percentage points, or 65% of the estimated racial difference.  
Racial differences in exposure to college educated workers of the same race are 0.101, implying 
a standardized effect of 1.6 percentage points, which is actually larger than the 1.3 percentage 
point effect of share college on the black-white wage gap from Table 4.  These findings 
complement earlier work by Hellerstein et al. (2009) arguing that employment networks operate 
along racial lines, and suggest that not only finding a job, but also benefiting from returns to 
agglomeration on the job, depend on own-race share in the workplace.23     
Do Racial Networks Affect Productivity? 
In order to examine whether racial networks affect productivity (rather than affecting 
wages through, for example, improved bargaining), we turn to estimating models of firm 
productivity using establishment data gathered in the 1997 Census of Manufacturers. We are 
                                                          
22 We also investigated estimating models where the effect of own race is allowed to vary by the individual’s race.  
The estimated racial differences in the effect of own race on the returns to density and share college were very noisy 
and entirely uninformative. 
23 The appendix presents robustness tests that involve additional controls at the PUMA level, which is the same level 
at which own race is measured.  Specifically, the appendix shows that our results are robust to including controls for 
non-linear returns to density and share college, controls for PUMA-level worker racial and ethnic composition, and 
to specifying share own race based on a black – non-black classification. We also examine subsamples of industries 
with high and low returns to employment density and share college based on the estimated coefficients of the 
interactions between these variables and industry fixed effects.  However, in both cases, the subsample of high 
return industries is small enough that the large number of cell by tract fixed effects yields very noisy and 
insignificant estimates in the high sample and results very similar to our baseline results in the low sample.   
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restricted to examining only manufacturing data because information on the cost of materials and 
on the stock of capital, which is necessary to estimate total factor productivity (TFP), is only 
available for the manufacturing industry.24  
Using these data, we can estimate models for firm net revenues (total revenues minus 
material costs) as a translog25 function of structure capital, equipment capital, and employment. 
For employment, we follow Moretti (2004) and Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske (1999) and 
develop estimates of the share of workers at a firm with four year college degrees based on 
analysis of three-digit industry code by zip code cells in the decennial Census. This share is 
combined with firm total employment to estimate the number of college-educated and non-
college-educated workers.26 In cases where we cannot match establishment zip code to decennial 
Census data, we base our estimates on industry-PUMA cells. All models control for three digit 
industry and metropolitan area fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the level of the 
work-location PUMA.   
The results of our baseline translog model are shown in Table 8 column 1. We estimate 
that the effect of a one-standard-deviation increase in the share of workers in a PUMA who are 
college-educated on firm total factor productivity is 0.020.  This estimate is comparable in 
                                                          
24We also explore estimating the wage models for a subsample of manufacturing workers.  Again, the estimates are 
qualitatively very similar to the results in Table 7, but have very large standard errors and are statistically 
insignificant.   
25 We have also estimated the model using a Cobb-Douglas production function (results available upon request). 
However, we strongly prefer the translog.  Theoretically, the translog model allows the marginal product of factor 
returns to change with the level of factors employed in production addressing concerns raised by Ciccone and Peri 
(2006) that models of human capital externalities may confound spillovers with changes in the mix of inputs. 
Further, the r-squared increases from 0.84 to 0.91 when moving from Cobb-Douglas to translog, a huge increase 
given the relatively small change in available degrees of freedom. The resulting F-statistic is 8,147, dramatically 
rejecting the Cobb-Douglas model. Further, the translog model yields much more precise estimates of both the 
return to employment density and the return to share college-educated; the standard errors fall by 30 and 35 percent, 
respectively. This difference between the translog and Cobb-Douglas models in terms of R-squared and precision of 
estimates does not arise in Moretti’s across-metropolitan-area models. 
26 Because our analysis looks within metropolitan areas and we have confidential data for both the decennial Census 
and the Census of Manufacturers, we are able to estimate the number of college-educated and other workers in each 
firm based on placing firms into three digit industry code by zip code cells, rather than industry code by 
metropolitan area cells as done by Moretti (2004). 
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magnitude to Moretti’s cross-MSA estimates that a one-standard-deviation increase in share 
college-educated increases total factor productivity by between 0.035 and 0.049, especially given 
that our estimate is reduced substantially by the inclusion of a control for employment density.    
For each industry-zip code cell, we also use the decennial Census data to calculate the 
share of the workforce that is white, black, Hispanic, or Asian-American. Using these shares, we 
calculate the average exposure of workers in an industry-zip code cell to workers of the same 
race at other firms in this PUMA-industry. We calculate a similar measure for exposure of a 
firm’s workforce to college-educated workers of the same race in the PUMA-industry in which 
their firm is located. We then interact these two variables with the PUMA-industry employment 
density and the PUMA-industry share college-educated, respectively, in order to test whether 
returns to agglomeration in terms of actual firm productivity depends upon firm employees’ 
within-race interaction opportunities. We also include direct controls for the racial composition 
of the workers in each firm cell.  
The estimates including these variables are shown in column 2.  We find a strong, 
statistically significant effect on productivity of the interaction between firm workers’ average 
exposure to own-race workers in PUMA-industry and employment density. In fact, our estimates 
suggest that there is no return to employment density for a firm whose workers have no exposure 
to same-race workers in the PUMA. Similarly, there is no increase in productivity from increased 
exposure to same-race workers when holding industry density of employment constant. In other 
words, increased density of employment increases a firm’s productivity, but only to the extent 
that the increased density comes from an increase in the number of workers of the same race as 
that firm’s workers.  
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The estimated interaction between firm average exposure to same-race college-educated 
workers and returns to share college-educated workers in a PUMA, while  not quite statistically 
significant in column 2 (p-value=.11),  is in the expected direction and sizable, with nearly the 
same magnitude as the estimate in column 1 of the direct effect of share college-educated in the 
PUMA. The direct estimate on share college falls from 0.20 to 0.09 with the inclusion of the 
interaction term, and a firm with zero exposure to college-educated workers in the PUMA who 
are the same race as its own college-educated workers is estimated to receive one-half the 
productivity benefit from college-educated workers in the PUMA that the average firm does, 
according to the point estimates.  
In column 3 we include controls for the unobserved ability of workers at the firm based 
on the residential location of those workers27 and an indicator for whether we were able to match 
zip codes between the establishment and decennial Census data or were required to match based 
on industry-by-PUMA cells. In this model, the effect of the firm’s own race match with its work 
location on return to density is very stable, and the effect of race match on return to share college 
increases by 19 percent and becomes statistically significant. Further, the estimated return to 
share college with zero average exposure is now a mere 12 percent of the original estimate in 
column 1.   
Table 9 presents a series of robustness checks for the final model in Table 8 by adding a 
series of fixed effects.28 Column 2 includes indicators for three-digit-industry interacted with 
density and share college-educated; column 3 includes PUMA fixed effects; and column 4 
                                                          
27 In other words, we control for unobserved worker ability using the mean of the residential-tract fixed effect 
estimate of the employees of the firm. The estimates for mean tract FE/unobserved worker ability are not shown 
because the variable is included in the translog production as another input and so involves several interactions. 
However, we also estimated the Cobb-Douglas model with this control and find that, as expected, the mean tract FE 
variable has a positive and statistically significant effect on firm net revenue with an estimate of 0.145 and a t-
statistic of 2.69.   
28 These results are included in the paper rather than with the other robustness checks in the appendix because they 
have a relatively dramatic effect on the magnitude of the estimates.  
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includes both. Each of these changes greatly increases the precision of the estimates, as well as 
the magnitude of the return to share college interacted with same-race college-educated 
exposure. In terms of magnitude, racial differences in exposure to firms with high values on the 
own race variables can also explain a substantial fraction of the black-white wage gap.  Given 
these racial differences, one standard deviation increase in exposure to employment density is 
associated with a 0.3 to 0.7 percentage point increase in the black-white wage gap, while a one 
standard deviation increase in exposure to share college is associated with between a 0.9 and 2.1 
percentage point increase.  These changes are very similar in magnitude to the own race effects 
estimated in the wage models of 1.1 and 1.6 percentage points for employment density and share 
college. 
Finally, Table 10 shows results for subsamples split by how much they rely on 
innovation: columns 1 and 2 split by whether the three-digit industry has high vs. low research 
and development spending; columns 3 and 4 split by whether the three-digit industry has a high 
vs. low rate of patent production.29 Again, precision increases, and effects are much larger for the 
share college-educated interacted with same-race college-educated exposure in high-R&D and 
high-patent industries, as one might expect. For employment density, effects are similar across 
R&D but are significantly higher in the high patent than in the low-patent industries.  Overall, 
the estimates in Tables 8 through 10 strongly support the hypothesis that returns to 
agglomeration are driven by increases in productivity due to workers’ interactions with others of 
the same race. 
 
 
                                                          
29 We are grateful to Bill Kerr at the Harvard Business School for providing us with this data.  For more details on 
the R&D spending data see Kerr and Fu (2008) and for the patent data see Kerr (2008). 
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Social distance by workplace racial composition  
Finally, we examine whether self-reported patterns of individual association are 
consistent with the hypothesis that social ties are disproportionately within-race, even for those 
whose workplaces include no same-race peers. While it is well-established that most social 
interactions are within-race, it may be that workers who lack colleagues of the same race develop 
strong cross-race relationships, which would cast doubt on the proposed mechanism for our 
findings. To test this possibility, we draw on data from the U.S. General Social Survey, which 
has been fielded every one or two years since 1972 and contains a standardized set of 
demographic and attitudinal questions, many of which are asked consistently over time.   A 
substantial number of respondents across a number of waves are surveyed on: racial attitudes; the 
racial composition of their workplace; and how close they feel to blacks and to whites.  We focus 
on black and white respondents, as questions were not comparable for Hispanics and Asian-
Americans. Our sample includes employed blacks and whites who responded to surveys in which 
the relevant questions were asked.30 The sample is further truncated specific to each dependent 
variable by setting the variable to missing when the question was not answered by the 
respondent.  Whenever a respondent does not supply an answer for an independent variable used 
in our analysis, that variable is set to zero, and an indicator that the variable is missing is set to 
one, for regressions including that independent variable. 
The first set of models that we estimate examines racial attitudes as a function of the 
racial composition of the firm.  We investigate survey responses to:  a political attitudes question 
about whether enough is being done by the government to address the condition of blacks, a 
                                                          
30 Race, closeness to whites and blacks and attitude toward government help for blacks was asked in all years of the 
survey. Workplace racial composition was determined in 1990 and biannually (i.e., in every survey) between 1996 
and 2010, so nearly all of the analysis uses survey waves 1990 and 1996 through 2010. The exception is the analysis 
of attitude toward interracial marriage, which was discontinued as a question in 2002, meaning that analysis of that 
attitude is restricted to 1990 and 1996 through 2002. 
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social attitudes question about whether the respondent approves of a law banning interracial 
marriage, and a pair of personal attitudes questions about how close the respondent is to whites 
and how close the respondent is to blacks.  We also construct a measure of the difference in an 
individual’s reported closeness to blacks relative to whites. Our estimation sample is all 
employed whites and blacks who responded to the specific racial attitude question.  The purpose 
of these models is to test whether more positive attitudes towards blacks are held by whites (and 
vice versa) when an individual interacts with more whites (non-whites) in the workplace. We 
estimate a model including an indicator for race, a measure of the percent white in workplace, 
and an interaction of the two; the model also includes indicators for survey year, for missing 
response to percent white in workplace, and for the interaction of race with missing response to 
percent white in workplace.31 
Table 11 reports results. Estimates in columns 1 and 2 demonstrate that, while African-
Americans are more likely to support increased government help for blacks than are whites and 
are less likely to oppose interracial marriage, views on these issues do not differ by the racial 
composition of the firm, among either blacks or whites. This suggests that there is no systematic 
sorting by racial attitudes into firms with different racial compositions,32 and no effect of percent 
white in a firm on individual employees’ broader racial attitudes. By contrast, columns 3 through 
5 demonstrate that there is a strong relationship between firm percent white and employee 
reports of closeness to whites and to blacks. 
Not surprisingly, blacks overall report being closer to blacks than do whites and report 
being less close to whites than do whites; the additional “social distance” between blacks and 
                                                          
31 We have also estimated this set of regressions with fixed effects for MSA; standard errors increase but neither 
coefficients nor the pattern of significance changes.  
32 Analysis using the percent black in the respondent’s MSA/one-digit-industry produce qualitatively similar, though 
less precise,  results, providing further evidence that our results are not due to race-specific sorting into firms based 
on attitudes (results available upon request). 
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whites, relative to whites with whites, is 1.3 points on a 9-point scale. In addition, people in 
whiter workplaces report being 1.2 points less close to blacks and 0.3 points closer to whites. 
Most relevant to the central question of this paper is the following: while black employees of 
otherwise all-white firms report being 0.7 (nonsignificant) points closer to whites than do blacks 
employed in all-nonwhite firms, they are still significantly less close to whites than are whites—
even whites employed in all-nonwhite firms (who are 1.3 points closer to whites than are blacks 
in all-nonwhite firms). These results are suggestive (although they cannot be conclusive) that 
African-Americans fail to access white social networks to the extent that whites do, even when 
the African-American in question works in an all-white firm.   
VI. Discussion 
This paper demonstrates that blacks receive lower returns to agglomeration economies in 
their place of work than do whites, a pattern that may contribute to overall racial income 
disparities and a host of other social concerns in the U.S. that are believed to be exacerbated by 
income inequality. Racial differences both in the return to employment density and in human 
capital spillovers associated with worker education levels are robust to controlling for differences 
in the returns over demographics, industry, occupation, and metropolitan area, and to controlling 
for unobserved differences in skill as proxied by residential location. The black-white difference 
in returns to employment density is substantially larger than the estimate on any other 
demographic characteristic, including education, and the magnitude of the effect is relatively 
stable even after including controls that substantially erode the black-white wage gap. While the 
estimated racial differences in the return to share college decline substantially relative to simple 
within metropolitan area estimates, our general findings for share college are robust across a 
series of specifications.  
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 Several pieces of evidence suggest that black undercompensation is driven by race-
specific social networks in the workplace. First, the returns to both density and share college-
educated increase as the fraction of workers who share an individual’s race increases, and racial 
differences in own-race share of workers explain a substantial fraction of the black-white 
differences in returns. Second, we estimate a model of firm total factor productivity for a sample 
of manufacturing establishments to directly test whether the exposure of firm workers to workers 
of the same race at other firms affects firm productivity. We find strong evidence that the returns 
to agglomeration rise as the average exposure of workers in a firm to same race peers (or of 
college-educated workers in the firm to same-race college-educated peers) rises. Finally, we find 
that the social distance blacks report with respect to whites persists even among blacks who work 
in all-white firms, suggesting that blacks do in fact experience relatively little access to white 
workplace networks.  
As a whole, these findings are consistent with racial differences in social interactions 
between workers explaining a substantial fraction of the black-white wage gap that is observed in 
U.S. urban areas.  Our preferred model with demographic cell by tract fixed effects results in an 
unexplained black-white difference in wages of 6.9 percentage points.  In comparison, given 
racial differences in exposure to own race workers, one standard deviation changes in 
employment density and share college are associated with 1.1 and 1.6 percentage point increases 
in the black-white wage gap.  Similarly, given racial differences in exposure to firms whose 
racial composition matches the dominant racial group of surrounding workers, one standard 
deviation changes in employment density and share college are associated with 0.7 and 2.0 
percentage point (given our preferred models) increases in the black-white difference in exposure 
to firm productivity.  We conclude that social distance between blacks and whites preventing 
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shared benefits from agglomeration is a significant contributor to overall black-white wage 
disparities in U.S. metropolitan areas. 
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Appendix:  Wage Model Robustness Tests 
I.  Standard errors 
As a robustness test for our standard errors, following Donald and Lang (2007), we 
estimate the coefficients 𝛾𝑠𝑥 separately for each demographic cell-metropolitan area group, in 
recognition of the fact that the demographic differences in the return to agglomeration captured 
by 𝜃 are only identified by variation across the groups defined by demographic cell x and 
metropolitan area s.  . However, given the incidental controls 𝑊𝑖𝑠, we estimate this model in 
three stages.  First, we estimate  
𝑦𝑖𝑥𝑠𝑡 = 𝑍𝑖𝑥𝑠𝑡𝛾 + 𝑊𝑖𝑠𝜌 + 𝑍𝑖𝑥𝑠𝑡𝑊𝑖𝑠𝜋+ 𝛿𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀�𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑥𝑡       (A1) 
in order to remove the effect of the incidental controls 𝑊𝑖𝑠 while mitigating bias by estimating 
parameters using within-demographic-cell residential location group variation.  Second, we 
estimate the demographic cell-MSA group-specific parameters on 𝑍𝑖𝑥𝑠𝑡  using the following 
equation: 
(𝑦𝑖𝑥𝑠𝑡 − 𝑦�𝑖𝑥𝑠𝑡) = (𝑍𝑖𝑥𝑠𝑡 −  ?̅?𝑥𝑠𝑡)𝛾𝑥𝑠 + 𝜀̃̃𝑖𝑥𝑠𝑡        (A2) 
Note that it is infeasible to estimate equation (A2) in levels rather than, as written, in deviations, 
because the inclusion of the incidental controls 𝑊𝑖𝑠 in the demographic cell-MSA group specific 
models would lead to severe attrition in the resulting sample. Finally, we estimate 
𝛾�𝑠𝑥 = 𝑋𝑠𝑥𝜃 + 𝜑𝑠 + (𝛾�𝑠𝑥 − 𝛾𝑠𝑥) + ?̅?𝑥𝑠        (A3) 
using feasible GLS, as described in Donald and Lang (2007), where ?̅?𝑥𝑠 is the group mean of any 
individual-specific heterogeneity in the return to agglomeration.  This approach is imperfect 
because estimates of 𝜋 may be biased by the omission of 𝑍𝑗𝑠𝑋𝑠𝑥𝜃 from the first stage, but this 
bias is mitigated by use of demographic cell-tract fixed effects, which reduces the correlation 
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between 𝑋𝑠𝑥  and the incidental controls 𝑊𝑖𝑠 . 33   Nonetheless, we only use the multi-stage 
approach as a general check on the inference provided by clustered standard errors in the 
baseline model, and all wage model estimates presented in the body of the paper rely on direct 
estimation of equations (2) and (3) with standard errors clustered at the census tract level. 
Table A1 shows the results of the two-stage estimation, where standard errors are the 
result of GLS estimation. The standard errors are relatively stable for the two-stage estimates, 
declining from 0.0028 based on the clustered standard errors presented in Table 6 to 0.0021 for 
the black-white gap in return to employment density and increasing from 0.027 in table 6 to 
0.032 for the black-white gap in return to share college. These findings suggest that clustering at 
the tract level provides reasonable standard errors for inference, particularly for employment 
density.  While, as discussed above, we have some concerns about bias in estimating the racial 
gap when using the three-stage approach, the estimated racial differences are quite stable for 
employment density (0.0081 as compared to 0.0083 in the top panel) and reasonably stable for 
share college (falling from 0.0776 to a two stage estimate of 0.0528).   
II.  Alternative fixed effects specifications     
Next, we examine the robustness of our racial differences in returns to alternative fixed 
effect structures. Specifically, Table A2 presents the estimated differential returns to 
employment density and share college for the same set of fixed effect structures that were 
considered in Table 4. The estimated black-white differences in the return to employment density 
and share college are relatively stable, with the employment density estimates ranging between 
                                                          
33 As discussed above, it is not feasible to skip the first stage and estimate equation (A2) in levels with the incidental 
controls because the number of incidental variables is large and would lead to substantial selection in our final 
sample of groups in equation (6).  The alternative of estimating equation (5) in levels without the incidental controls 
suffers from the same bias as the above approach, but the bias is exacerbated because the correlations between 𝑋𝑠𝑥 




0.0054 and 0.0086 and the share college estimates ranging between 0.0411 and 0.0776.  The 
inclusion of tract fixed effects reduces black-white differences in the return to employment 
density and share college somewhat, but the use of block group fixed effects has no additional 
impact on these estimates and the use of tract by demographic cell fixed effects increases these 
estimates.  The use of census tract by industry or occupation fixed effects leads to moderate 
reductions in the estimated black-white differences.  Unlike for blacks, the inclusion of tract by 
demographic cell fixed effects substantially erodes the estimated differences for Hispanics and 
Asians.  A similar erosion of the Hispanic wage gap was observed in Table 4 with the inclusion 
of tract by demographic cell fixed effects.     
III.  Additional controls 
Finally, we revisit our key model results presented in Table 7 for a series of additional 
controls at the workplace PUMA level.  Table A3 column 1 repeats the black and own race 
results from Table 7.  The second column allows the return to employment density and share 
college to be non-linear by incorporating the square of these variables into the wage equation.  
The third column incorporates additional PUMA controls, e.g. the percent of workers in a 
PUMA who are black, Hispanic or Asian. The fourth column repeats own race analysis in 
Column 1 except that percent black in workplace is used for black workers and percent non-
black is used for all other workers.  Both the estimated racial differences in returns to 
employment density and share college and the estimated effects of own race on return to these 







Figure 1.  
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White Black Hispanic Asian
Sample size 1,705,058 226,173 264,880 135,577
Average hourly wage 28.6959 (45.6694) 19.5287 (31.1947) 17.7986 (32.7494) 26.1993 (40.8411)
Employment density in own one digit industry 0.4606 (2.1408) 0.5348 (2.0841) 0.4436 (1.9072) 0.7810 (2.6242)
Share workers with college degree in industry 0.3549 (0.1703) 0.3456 (0.1687) 0.2959 (0.1580) 0.3926 (0.1726)
Share of workers of own race or ethnicity 0.7403 (0.1414) 0.1949 (0.1282) 0.2138 (0.1523) 0.1152 (0.0882)
Share college educated workers own race/ethnicity 0.3055 (0.0846) 0.0484 (0.0386) 0.0328 (0.0334) 0.0618 (0.0491)
Percent college educated in MSA and occupation 0.0414 (0.0433) 0.0276 (0.0357) 0.0224 (0.0314) 0.0386 (0.0404)
Percent college educated in MSA and industry 0.0401 (0.0322) 0.0409 (0.0353) 0.0334 (0.0290) 0.0459 (0.0339)
Age 30 to 39 0.4111 (0.4920) 0.4499 (0.4975) 0.5462 (0.4979) 0.4738 (0.4993)
Age 40 to 49 0.3663 (0.4818) 0.3605 (0.4801) 0.3103 (0.4626) 0.3455 (0.4755)
Age 50 to 59 0.2225 (0.4160) 0.1896 (0.3920) 0.1435 (0.3505) 0.1807 (0.3848)
Less than high school degree 0.0512 (0.2205) 0.1257 (0.3315) 0.3908 (0.4879) 0.1068 (0.3089)
High school degree 0.2043 (0.4032) 0.2863 (0.4520) 0.2181 (0.4130) 0.1159 (0.3201)
Associates degree 0.3020 (0.4519) 0.3560 (0.4788) 0.2391 (0.4265) 0.2037 (0.4027)
Four year college degree 0.2670 (0.4424) 0.1536 (0.3605) 0.0932 (0.2907) 0.2897 (0.4536)
Master degree 0.1126 (0.3161) 0.0546 (0.2272) 0.0324 (0.1770) 0.1706 (0.3762)
Degree beyond Masters 0.0629 (0.2428) 0.0239 (0.1528) 0.0264 (0.1603) 0.1132 (0.3168)
Single with no children 0.2296 (0.4206) 0.2811 (0.4496) 0.1822 (0.3860) 0.1483 (0.3554)
Married with no children 0.0289 (0.1674) 0.0762 (0.2653) 0.0744 (0.2624) 0.0276 (0.1638)
Single with children 0.3022 (0.4592) 0.2686 (0.4432) 0.2343 (0.4236) 0.2828 (0.4504)
Married with children 0.4393 (0.4963) 0.3741 (0.4839) 0.5091 (0.4999) 0.5413 (0.4983)
Born in the United States 0.9279 (0.2587) 0.8490 (0.3580) 0.3778 (0.4848) 0.1153 (0.3194)
Not born in U.S. resident less than 8 years 0.0149 (0.1212) 0.0272 (0.1626) 0.0966 (0.2954) 0.1807 (0.3848)
Not born in the U.S. resident 8 years or more 0.0572 (0.2322) 0.1238 (0.3294) 0.5256 (0.4993) 0.7040 (0.4565)
Table 1: Descriptives
Notes: Means and standard deviations are for a sample of 2,343,092 observations containing all male full-time workers aged 30 to 59  
who responded to the 2000 Decennial Census long form survey and reside in metropolitan areas with populations over 1 million 








Independent Variables Baseline Model
Employment density in own one digit industry (1000s per square KM) 0.0118 (16.23)
Share workers with college degree within own industry 0.3894 (27.87)
African-American worker -0.1465 (-45.11)
Hispanic worker -0.1656 (-49.39)
Asian and Pacific Islander worker -0.1349 (-24.00)
Other race -0.1516 (-22.61)
Age 40-49 0.1010 (66.72)
Age 50-59 0.1568 (66.91)
Less than high school degree -0.1456 (-59.85)
Associates degree 0.0851 (54.37)
Four year college degree 0.2711 (113.63)
Master degree 0.3903 (105.64)
Degree beyond Masters 0.5069 (117.4)
Single with children 0.0548 (22.19)
Married with children 0.2110 (94.37) 
Married without children 0.1335 (96.46)
Not born in U.S. resident less than 8 years -0.2533 (-46.21)
Not born in the U.S. resident 8 years or more -0.0987 (-33.62)
Percent college educated in MSA and occupation 0.7453 (5.37)
Percent college educated in MSA and industry 1.1029 (8.23)
Sample Size 2,343,092
R-squared 0.2873
Table 2: Baseline Agglomeration Model for Logarithm of the Wage Rate
Notes: Coefficients from a model with metropolitan fixed effects and heteroskedasticity-robust standard 





Unconditional Correlations White Indicator Black Indicator
Employment density in 1000’s per square KM -0.0179 0.0077
Share workers with college degree 0.0531 -0.0073
Conditional on Metropolitan Fixed Effects
Employment density in 1000’s per square KM -0.0034 0.0034
Share workers with college degree 0.0346 -0.0222
Conditional on Tract Fixed Effects
Employment density in 1000’s per square KM 0.0002 0.0037
Share workers with college degree -0.0005 0.0072
Sample Size
Table 3: Correlations between Race and Workplace Attributes
2,343,092
Notes: Correlations for regression sample with an indicator variable for race of worker.  Conditional 
















African-American worker -0.1465 -0.0696 -0.0623 -0.0694 -0.0710 -0.0662
(-45.11) (-38.81) (-33.55) (-19.76) (-33.18) (-36.68)
Hispanic worker -0.1657 -0.0939 -0.0859 -0.0660 -0.0909 -0.0881
(-49.40) (-53.49) (-47.70) (-17.83) (-43.92) (-49.81)
Asian and Pacific Islander worker -0.1349 -0.1041 -0.1010 -0.0963 -0.0986 -0.1038
(-24.00) (-43.15) (-40.81) (-16.01) (-35.71) (-42.56)
R-square 0.2873 0.3307 0.3572 0.6718 0.4467 0.3436
Table 4: Race Coefficients with Various Fixed Effects Structures
Race Coefficients from Wage Equation
Notes: Race and ethnicity coefficients from fixed effect models using the regression sample of 2,343,092 observations 
and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered on PUMA of employment. T-statistics in parentheses.
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Employment density in 1000’s per square KM 0.0138 (14.98)
Share workers with college degree 0.4390 (28.69)
R-squared 0.2461
Sample size  1,705,058
Employment density in 1000’s per square KM 0.0047 (5.80)
Share workers with college degree 0.1453 (6.57)
R-squared 0.2108
Sample size 226,173
Employment density in 1000’s per square KM 0.0097 (9.09)
Share workers with college degree 0.2069 (9.15)
R-squared 0.2536
Sample size 264,880
Employment density in 1000’s per square KM 0.0076 (6.48)
Share workers with college degree 0.3885 (12.19)
R-squared 0.3316
Sample size 135,577
Notes: Coefficients from a model with metropolitan fixed effects and 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered on PUMA of employment. T-
statistics in parentheses.









Fully Interacted Model Employment Density Share College Educated
African-American worker -0.0083***(-2.99) -0.0776***(-2.92)
Hispanic worker -0.0021 (-0.58) 0.0157 (0.39)
Asian and Pacific Islander worker -0.0044 (-1.16) 0.1215**(2.05)
Age 40-49 0.0014 (1.02) 0.0721*** (5.14)
Age 50-59 0.0009 (0.44) 0.1238*** (5.64)
Less than high school degree -0.0062 (-1.29) -0.0408 (-1.10)
Associates degree 0.0007 (0.31) 0.1044*** (6.02)
Four year college degree 0.0022 (1.02) 0.1522*** (7.29)
Master degree 0.0050**(2.03) 0.1920*** (6.24)
Degree beyond Masters 0.0043 (1.20) 0.3689*** (6.00)
Single with children -0.0025 (-0.26) -0.0380 (-0.63)
Married with children 0.0033* (1.92) -0.0353** (-2.07)
Married without children 0.0022 (1.02) -0.0248 (-1.20)
Not born in U.S. resident less than 8 years -0.0016 (-0.31) 0.0390 (0.46)
Not born in the U.S. resident 8 years or more -0.0004 (-0.13) 0.0741* (1.81)
R-square
Sample size
Table 6: Model of the Wage Return to Agglomeration
0.7139
2,331,688
Notes:  Coefficient estimates from the interactions of employment density and share college with demographic 
attributes based on a model specification that includes demographic cell by census tract fixed effects and 
interacts both employment density and share college with demographic attributes, industry, occuption, and 





Table 7:  Agglomeration Model with Own Share Controls
Baseline Model Employment Density Share College Educated
African-American worker -0.0083***(-2.99) -0.0776***(-2.92)
Hispanic worker -0.0021 (-0.58) 0.0157 (0.39)
Asian and Pacific Islander worker -0.0044 (-1.16) 0.1215**(2.05)
R-Square
with Own Share Controls
African-American worker 0.0140* (1.65) 0.0030 (0.06)
Hispanic worker 0.0234**(2.40) 0.0821 (1.36)
Asian and Pacific Islander worker 0.0215**(2.16) 0.1918***(2.69)
Own Share in Workplace 0.0537***(2.74)






Notes:  Coefficient estimates from the interactions of employment density and share college with race and 
ethnicity based on a model specification that includes demographic cell by census tract fixed effects and 
interacts both employment density and share college with demographic attributes, industry, occuption, 
and metropolitan area.  The first panel repeats the estimates from Table 6, and the second panel presents 
estimates for a model that includes controls for share own race workers and share own race college 
educated workers in work PUMA.  The own share estimates presented are the interactions with 
employment density and share college. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered on the 







Employment Density 0.0288*** (16.68) -0.0012 (-0.10) -0.0001 (-0.00)
Own-Race Exposure Index -0.065 (-0.70) -0.0567 (-0.63)
Density*Race Exposure Index 0.0919** (2.57) 0.0913*** (2.94)
Share College 0.2033*** (8.30) 0.096 (1.30) 0.0253 (0.34)
Share College Own Race Exp Index 0.0534 (0.42) 0.0236 (0.20)
Share College*Coll Race Exp Index 0.1779 (1.59) 0.2115* (1.91)
R Squared 0.9086 0.9086 0.9088
Sample size 111695 111695 111538
Table 8 Total Factor Productivity models 
Notes:  Coefficients estimates of firm revenue net of materials cost in a translog model of production where 
inputs are capital equipment, capital structure, college educated labor and non-college educated labor; the last 
column also includes average unobserved quality based on worker residential locations and the tract FE 
estimates from the wage model in column 2 of Table 4.  Model is estimated for respondents of the 1997 Census 
of Manufacturers  in  metropolitan areas with population over 1 million residents.  The model also includes 
metropolitan area and three digit industry fixed effects.  Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered 







Density*Index 0.0913*** (2.94) 0.1922*** (8.81) 0.1190*** (8.11) 0.1851*** (10.45)
Coll share*Coll Index 0.2115* (1.91) 0.2939** (2.52) 0.4377*** (2.72) 0.4897*** (2.87)
FEs for 3-digit-Ind*(Density, Coll share) X X
PUMA fixed effects X X
R Squared 0.9088 0.9094 0.9102 0.9106
Sample size 111538 111538 111538 111538
Table 9 Total Factor Productivity models with 3-digit industry FE interactions and/or PUMA FE
Notes:  Coefficients estimates of firm revenue net of materials cost in a translog model of production where inputs are capital 
equipment, capital structure, college educated labor and non-college educated labor, and unobserved quality based on the 
worker residential locations.  Column 1 repeats the estimates from Column 3 of Table 8, and the next columns add the interaction 
of three digit industry FE's with employment density and share college, PUMA FE's and both sets of FE's, respectively.  







Above median Below median Above median Below median
Density*Index 0.1609*** (4.10) 0.1611*** (4.10) 0.0952** (2.24) -0.0873 (-0.59)
Coll share*Coll Index 0.7386*** (2.92) 0.0551 (0.27) 0.7358*** (3.04) 0.2049*** (6.24)
R Squared 0.908 0.9125 0.9049 0.9162
Sample size 61194 50344 65412 46126
Table 10: Total Factor Productivity Models by Level of Research Activity
R&D activity in 3-digit industry: Patent activity in 3-digit industry:
Notes:  Coefficients estimates by firms with above or below median levels of R&D expenditures or patent activity 
based on a model of firm revenue net of materials cost in a translog model of production where inputs are capital 
equipment, capital structure, college educated labor and non-college educated labor, and unobserved quality based 
on the worker residential locations.  All models include industry FE's, the interaction of the industry FE's with 
employment density and share college, and PUMA FE's.  Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered on 
PUMA of employment. T-statistics in parentheses.
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Black -0.754*** -0.079* 1.376*** -1.274*** -2.613***
(-13.963) (-2.394) (6.949) (-6.184) (-11.119)
Workplace % white 0.051 -0.042 -1.226*** 0.273* 1.52***
(0.981) (-1.355) (-9.015) (2.150) (9.325)
Black*workplace % white 0.026 0.025 0.98** 0.438 -0.606
(0.333) (0.543) (3.063) (1.369) (-1.582)
N 6,603 3,964 6,505 6,469 6,437
Table 11: Relationship between workplace racial composition and responses to survey questions about race
Notes: Estimates based on Black and non-Hispanic white sample respondents to the General Social Survey in 
relevant years. Model specification includes indicators for year of survey and for missing report of workplace 








Independent Variables Employment Density Share College Educated
African-American worker -0.0081*** (-3.80) -0.0528* (-1.65)
Hispanic worker -0.0052 (-1.37) -0.0291 (-0.65)
Asian and Pacific Islander worker -0.0063* (-1.74) -0.0401 (-0.37)
Second Stage R-square 0.2580 0.1067
Second Stage Sample Size 6203 6204
Table A1. Two Stage Model Estimates
Notes: Estimates from regressions of demographic cell by metropolitan area fixed effects from a wage equation on 
a vector of demographics and metropolitan area FE's using Feasible GLS.   Heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
















African-American worker -0.0086 -0.0075 -0.0076 -0.0083 -0.0054 -0.0071
(-10.07) (-9.47) (-9.23) (-2.99) (-5.26) (-8.84)
Hispanic worker -0.0076 -0.0041 -0.0042 -0.0021 -0.0037 -0.0035
(-9.90) (-4.86) (-4.71) (-0.58) (-3.65) (-4.02)
Asian and Pacific Islander worker -0.0108 -0.0071 -0.0068 -0.0044 -0.0071 -0.0070
(-13.81) (-7.35) (-6.86) (-1.16) (-6.25) (-7.22)
African-American worker -0.0687 -0.0491 -0.0491 -0.0776 -0.0411 -0.0416
(-5.69) (-5.76) (-5.57) (-2.92) (-3.51) (-4.76)
Hispanic worker 0.0440 0.0238 0.0224 0.0157 0.0037 0.0280
(3.15) (2.47) (2.25) (0.39) (0.30) (2.85)
Asian and Pacific Islander worker 0.1952 0.1821 0.1815 0.1215 0.1725 0.1873
(8.98) (13.57) (13.16) (2.05) (10.85) (13.79)
sample size 2,343,092 2,343,092 2,343,092 2,343,092 2,343,092 2,343,092
Table A2: Race Coefficients with varying Fixed Effects Structure
Race Differences in the Return to Employment Density 
Race Differences in the Return to Share College-Educated
Notes:  Coefficient estimates from the interactions of employment density (panel 1) and share college (panel 2) with 
demographic attributes based on a model specification that uses various fixed effect structures, includes controls for 
demographic attributes for all but the tract by cell fixed effects models, and interacts both employment density and share 
college with demographic attributes, industry, occupation, and metropolitan area.   Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 















African-American worker -0.0083***(-2.99) -0.0081***(-2.91) -0.0072***(-2.58) -0.0083***(-2.99)
with Own Share Controls
African-American worker 0.0140* (1.65) 0.0078 （0.92) 0.0124 (1.46) 0.0332*** (2.83)
Own Share in Workplace 0.0537***(2.74) 0.0385**(1.96) 0.0493**(2.51) 0.0639*** (3.53)
Share College Educated
African-American worker -0.0776***(-2.92) -0.0787***(-2.95) -0.0682**(-2.55) -0.0776***(-2.92)
with Own Share Controls
African-American worker 0.0030 (0.06) 0.0233 (0.44) 0.0310 (0.59) 0.0783 (1.00)
Own Share College Educated 0.1603**(2.26) 0.1929***(2.71) 0.1933***(2.71) 0.2276** (2.31)
Notes:  Coefficient estimates from the interactions of employment density (panel 1) and share college (panel 2) with demographic 
attributes based on a model specification that uses various fixed effect structures, includes controls for demographic attributes 
for all but the tract by cell fixed effects, and interacts both employment density and share college with demographic attributes, 
industry, occuption, and metropolitan area.  Column 2 includes the quadratic terms of employment density and share college, 
column 3 also includes controls for percent of black, hispanic, and Asian workers in each PUMA, and column 4 shows the results 
where own race is based on percent black and percent non-black.  The own share results are for models based the specifications 
in Table 7 panel 2.  Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered on the census tract of residence, and T-statistics in 
parentheses.
